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Abstract Traditionally, the academic debates about the benefits that the ex-
istence of multilevel government structures provide have been directly related to
the gains in efficiency that derive from the processes of decentralization of the
Public Sector. However, as of the last decades, the Public Finance has broadened
its analysis towards other questions, one of them being if the fiscal decentraliza-
tion influences positively in the economic growth of a country. The objective of
this document is to provide a “reading guide” for this new line of investigation
on the influence of fiscal decentralization on economic growth.
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1. Introduction
The relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth is a rela-
tively new line of investigation. The traditional vision of the Theory of Fiscal
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Federalism, only emphasizes the largest gains of eciency that derive from the
processes of decentralization of the Public Sector. Nevertheless, in the last decades
a new line of investigation arises that tries to discover if the processes of scal
decentralization can, equally, promote the economic growth of a country.
More concretely, this new eld of analysis is inspired by the reections made
by Oates (1993). Oates (1993) argues that if from a static perspective, the main
benets that derive from the installation of multilevel government systems are
expressed in terms of economic eciency; then from a dynamic perspective the
potentialities of the scal decentralization can be translated in terms of economic
growth.
The transcendency of this document resides in the fact of being able to oer
a \reading guide" that serves as a reference point to be able to investigate how
scal decentralization contributes to economic growth and explains the mecha-
nisms involved. In consequence, a rigorous analysis has been made on the most
outstanding empiric investigations about the impact that the existence of mul-
tilevel government structures have on the economic growth of a country. This
document summarises the main results that are derived of all these investiga-
tions, examining, both the temporal and space horizons selected in these studies,
comparing the conceptual framework and the methodology used by the dierent
authors, evaluating the indicators used in the construction of the \scal decen-
tralization" variable and the especication of the growth dependent variable.
2. Conceptual Framework on the Connection between Fiscal Decen-
tralization and Economic Growth
Many of you have discussed the costs and benets that the establishment of
multilevel government structures provides. In fact, the developed focus up until
recent dates has been centered in analyzing how, from a static perspective, de-
centralization can promote the economic eciency of the system. The possibility
that subcentral governments can satisfy, to a greater extent, the necessities of
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the individuals of their jurisdictions have been the main argument fenced in fa-
vor of the decentralization of those public goods and services whose benets have
clear space delimitations. Equally, for the sake of reaching bigger bench marks
of eciency, the existence of certain public services whose benets expand along
the whole national territory advises that the government level responsible for its
supply should be at the central level.
It is also necessary to remember that the main issue in the Theory of Fiscal
Federalism is not simply the dichotomy between centralization and decentraliza-
tion. Each government level has an important role to carry out. The challenge
that should be reached is to assign the responsibilities and the authority for
government's functions to the appropriate levels. From this perspective, scal
institutions should be designed to be able to incorporate incentives so that the
governing class can select policies that promote the economic growth of their
regions. In this sense, the traditional vision of the Theory of Fiscal Federalism
develops new lines of investigation, amongst those we can outline if scal decen-
tralization promotes economic growth.
Concretely, in the last decades, one of the most concerning matters, in dier-
ent international organizations is to determine if the economic activity of inferior
units of government can, to a certain point, foment the economic growth of a
country. To this respect, the intents to establish a connection between the phe-
nomena of the economic growth and the scal decentralization have been more
an intuitive question than a normative work.
The idea that underlies in this branch of the analysis of the Fiscal Federal-
ism is that, if from a static front, the scal decentralization of the Public Sec-
tor promotes the economic eciency, from a dynamic one it is able to promote
economic growth (Oates (1993)). The sub-central administrators know the ne-
cessities of infrastructures of their territories better than the central government
and, therefore, they can satisfy them, in a greater measure. Equally, economic
literature oers another possible explanation on the phenomenon cause-eect of
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economic growth and of scal decentralization: interpreting this last idea as a
superior good (Bahl and Linn 1992). Only in countries with relatively high per
capita income levels decentralization ends up being attractive, in the sense that
its benets can be much more exploited that their disadvantages. Nevertheless,
like Oates (1999) exposes, the relationship among the income level per capita of
a country and the grade of decentralization of its Public Sector should not be
interpreted as a monolithic relationship. It is not true that the decentralization
is intensied without limits depending on level of income of a country but rather
an optimal level of scal decentralization has to exist to be able to maximize the
economic growth of a country.
3. Theoretical Reference Model on the Connection between Fiscal
Decentralization and Economic Growth
Currently, economic literature provides two approaches for the impact that s-
cal decentralization provokes one country's economic growth versus endogenous
growth models. According to this classication, the previsions of the dierent
models of economic growth are conditioned, mainly by the hypothesis of the
function of production used and by the endogenous character or not of certain
economic variables. While neoclassical economists granted a small space to the
public intervention, endogenous models growth support that public policies can
aect long-term growth rates.
In a neoclassical environment, where variables economic determinants of growth
are considered as exogenous determinants, Solow's, model (1956) and the changes
posed by Mankin, Romer and Weil (1992) is presented as the more representa-
tive to identify analytically the possible inuence of the tax decentralization on
economic growth. Using a production function with perfect substitution among
the productive factor, this would let Solow to develop a model where the last en-
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gine of long term growth is only determined by exogenous technology changes1.
Therefore, in the neoclassical model of Solow, the instrumentation of policies to
encourage savings and investment has no place and therefore, positive impact on
the long-run rate2. Income on a declining scale in capital accumulation are key in
these models after setting up the connection exclusive between the rate of growth
and technological progress.
This framework is used by Thieben (2003), Eller (2004), Martinez Vazquez
and Macnab (2003), among others, to determine if there is a connection between
the tax decentralization and economic growth. The cornerstone of these works is
to admit that the exogenous parameter reects not only technological aspects of
the economy but also an economic performance of the Public Sector.
For its part, the emergence of endogenous growth models in the mid 1980s
gives way to a new wave of research on the impact that results in the performance
of the Public Sector on the rate of growth of the economy. The main dierence
of these models from neoclassic approaches is that these new models of economic
growth show a positive long-term growth rate without having to assume that some
of variables of the model increase in an exogenous way but in an endogenous one.
In an environment of endogenous growth, the theoretical models that analyze
the inuence causing the processes of scal decentralization in economic growth
are supported analytically by the model initially developed by Rebelo (1991)
and it is known as the AK's technology3. The Most relevant feature of the AK's
1 The model provided by Solow (1956) uses an economy characterized by perfectly
competitive markets of capital and labour, exibility in pricing, the existence of full
employment and a production function with constant returns to scale aggregated where
productive factors are diminishing , allowing a perfect replacement between capital and
labour.
2 Greater savings alone will aect product level but not the rate of growth in steady
state. Steady state is characterized by a time when the economy is situated at a specic
level, it stops the process of capital accumulation the technological development is the
only source of economic growth.
3 This technology known as AK, technology provides the easier endogenous model of
growth they can conceive, generating a growth rate at steady state dierentiable from
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model is that they maintain the neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition
and constant returns to scale and is reected in diminishing returns to capital4.
From a perspective of endogenous economic growth, the model that supplies
Barro (1990) becomes the starting point of this new wave of research. The main
characteristic of Barro (1990) model is to incorporate in its role.
The production of public services as a productive input for private production.
The productive role of public services is precisely that creates a direct connection
between spending and economic growth. Nevertheless, and despite the relevance
of the contributions of Barro (1990), endogenous growth models developed to
date did not stopped in determining whether a Government, characterized by a
multilevel governance structure, could aect the economic progress of a country.
It will be in the last nineties of the last century when dierent authors used
the contribution of Barro (1990) to extend the analysis of economic growth to an
extension of the literature of scal federalism. Zhang and Zou (19998) Davoodi
and Zou (1998), Xie, Zou Davoodi (1999), Zhang and Zou (2001), Akai and Sakata
(2002) are among others, the authors who have tried to establish whether there
really is a connection between the process of decentralization of public spending
and economic growth. All agree the use of the model of Barro (1990) as an
analytical tool to demonstrate the contribution of decentralization in economic
growth5.
zero. The characteristic more important of these models is that many of the factors
under the neoclassical model only aecting the level of income, now also aect the rate
of growth of this. In addition, these models provide freedom for the policies that aect
savings and investment have an eect on the countries' long-run growth rate.
4 AK model is the simplest contribution endogenous growth theory. This approach is
attributed to Rebelo (1991) who considered that the only way to achieve positive growth
rates in a model with constant returns to scale, was to present the production function
with constant returns to scale in relation to the factor which must be accumulated.
5 The role of production used is characterized by only with two inputs: private and
public capital. The last of the input, in turn, broken in two or three levels of Government,
according to the structure of Government of the country in question. Thus the level of
decentralization is dened as the spending allocated to each level of Government total
public expenditure.
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Under this specication, Zhang and Zou (1998) used in their model a pro-
duction function where public input is assigned by the central Government and
by local and intermediate levels6. According to the model developed by Zhang
and Zou (1998), fractions of public expenditure to be allocated to each level of
Government in order to maximize economic growth in a country are equal to
the ratios of individual productivity over the aggregate productivity. So that, if
current spending shares do not correspond with these growth-maximizing shares,
the Government should proceed to a reallocation between the three levels of
Government to improve the country's growth.
4. Empiric Evidence on the Connection between Fiscal Decentraliza-
tion and Economic Growth
The intuition that the processes of decentralization can potentialize the economic
growth of a country has originated, by the middle of the nineteen-nineties, dier-
ent works whose purpose was to contrast its empiric validity. With the purpose
of making the interpretation of the results reached in dierent studies easier, we
can establish the following classication. On one hand, the investigations that
center their interest in analyzing the relationship between scal decentralization
and economic growth from an international focus. On the other hand, studies
that limit themselves to verify the impact that multilevel government structures
causes in the growth of a certain country.
From an international perspective (studies among countries), there are a range
of studies that reects in quantitative terms the existent relationship between
scal decentralization and economic growth. The most outstanding contributions
correspond to Oates (1995); Phillips and Woller (1997); Davoodi and Zou (1998);
Yilmaz (1999); Thieben (2000; 2003; 2005) Martnez-Vazquez and M. McNab
6 See Zang and Zou (19998) analytical development of the model of the authors.
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(2003); Iimi (2006); Bodman and Ford (2006) and Thornton (2007), such and
like it is shown in the Table 1.
Table 1: Data coverage - Status Quo of the studies among countries. Source: self-
elaboration.
Author Space eld Time eld
Oates (1995) 40 countries without specication 1974-1989
Phillips and Woller (1997) 23 countries LDC 1974-1991
Davoodi and Zou (1998)
46 developing countries and OECD coun-
tries
1970-1989
Yilmaz (1999) 46 countries without specication 1971-1990
Thieben (2000)
15 countries of the UE, NO, SZ, JP, US,
CA, AU, NZ, AR, BR, KR, ZA,
1975-1995
Thieben (2003)
14 countries of the UE, NO, SZ, JP, US,
CA, AU, NZ, AR, BR, KR, ZA,
1973-1998
Martnez-Vazquez and Mc-
Nabc (2003)
52 developed countries and developing
countries
1972-1997
Thieben (2005) 21 High-income OECD Countries 1973-1998
Iimi (2005)
51 countries (7 low-income countries, 10
lower-middle countries, 12 upper-middle
countries and 22 high income countries.
1997-2001
Bodman and Ford (2006) 21 OECD Countries 1981-1998
Thornton (2007) 19 OECD Countries 1980-2000
LDC = Least Developed Counries; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment; UE = European Union; NO =Norway; SZ = Switzerland; JP = Japan; US = United States;
CA = Canada; AU = Australia; NZ = New Zealand; AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; KR =Korea;
ZA = South Africa.
The remaining investigations center their interest in determining the connec-
tion of both processes from a regional or national perspective (the single country
analysis), as one can observe in Table 2:
1. The behavior of the Chinese economy is analyzed in the studies of Zang and
Zou (1998); Jin, Quian and Weingast (1999); Lin and Liu (2000); Zhang
and Zou (2001) and Jin and Zou (2005)
2. The inuence of the process of scal decentralization in the economic
growth of the United States is depicted in the investigations of Xie, Zou and
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Davoodi (1999), Akai and Sakata (2002) and Akai, Nishimura and Sakata
(2004).
3. Behnisch, Buttner and Stegarescu (2003) analyze the German experience.
4. The repercussion of scal federalism in the economic performance of the
Swiss Cantons is studied in Feld, Kirchgassner and Schaltegger (2004).
5. The behavior of regions of India in connection with economic growth is
interpreted by Zhang and Zou (2001).
6. The evidence of regional growth in Russia is studied in the investigation of
Desai, Freinkman and Golberg (2003).
7. Finally, Carrion-i-Silvestre, Espasa and Mora (2006), Perez and Cantarero
(2006), Sole-Olle and Esteller-More (2006) and Esteban (2006) are among
the most recent studies, and they indicate the eect that scal decentral-
ization has caused in the economic growth of the Spain.
5. Chosen Variables
The previous spatial grouping is fundamental when examining the suitability of
the variables used by the dierent authors. The Table 3 picks up the dependent
and scal variables used, as well as the statistical sources that this data proceeds
from.
5.1. Dependent variable
As depicted in Table 3 the dependent variable used in the majority of the stud-
ies among countries is the growth rate of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
per capita, coming from International Financial Statistics of the international
Monetary Fund or of World Development Indicators of the World Bank (GDP).
Nevertheless, exceptions are Phillips and Woller (1997), Martnez-Vazquez and
McNab (2003) and Boadman and Ford (2006), who employ the logarithm real of
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Table 2: Data coverage - Status Quo of the single country analysis. Source: Self-
elaboration.
Autor Space eld Time eld
Zhang and Zou (1998) 28 provinces of China 1980-1992
Jin, Quian y Weingast (1999) 29 provinces of Chinas 1982-1992
Xie, Zou, Davoodi (1999) 50 states of USA 1948-1994
Lin y Liu (2000) 28 provinces of China 1970-1993
Zhang y Zou (2001)
29 provinces of Chinas 1987-1993
16 major states of India 1970-1994
Behnisch, Buettner Stegarescu
(2003)
Germany 1950-1990
Akai y Sakata (2002) 50 states of USA 1992-1996
Desai, Freinkman, Goldberg (2003) 80 Russian regions 1996-1999
Feld, Kirchgassner and Schaltrdger
(2004)
26 Swiss Cantons 1980-1998
Akai, Nishimura, Sakata (2004) 50 states of USA 1992-1997
Jin and Zou (2005) 30 provinces of Chinas
1979-1993
1994-1999
Carrion-i-Silvestre, Espasa and
Mora (2006)
17 Autonomous Communities
1980-1998
1991-1996
Perez and Cantarero (2006) 18 Autonomous Communities 1986-2001
Sole-Olle and Esteller-More (2006) 44 provinces of Spain 1976-1998
Esteban (2006) 15 Autonomous Communities 1997-2001
GDP per capita (GDP). Alternatingly, Thieben (2000;2003;2005) uses dierent
indicators to reect the growth rate of the economy of a country. This is, aver-
age growth rate of real gross xed capital formation - deated by the producer
price index - (GKAP), total factor productivity growth derived as a component
of a macroeconomic production function, (TFPG) and average gross investment
share of GDP (INVGDP). On the other hand, Iimi (2005) and Thornton (2007)
use the average growth rate real of GDP per capita for each country (GDP).
With the same approach, in single-countries studies, the dependent variable
used is the growth rate of real province (state) income (GYPREG) that comes
from the Ocial Institutes of Statistic of the considered country (Table 4). Nev-
ertheless, Behnisch, Buttner and Stegarescu (2003) opt to use \the rate of total
factor productivity growth" (TFPG); Desai, Freinkman and Goldberg (2003) se-
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Table 3: Chosen Variables - Status Quo of the studies among countries. Source: Self-
elaboration.
Author
Dependent
variable
Explanatory variable of the scal de-
centralization
Oates (1995) GDP FD-EXP, SR
Phillips and Woller
(1997)
GDP'
FD-EXP, FD-EXPNDEF , FD-REV, FD-
REVGIA
Davoodi and Zou (1998) GDP FD-EXP
Yilmaz (1999) GDP FD-EXP
Thieben (2000)
GDP, GKAP,
TFPG
FD-EXP, FD-EXP2, SR, CHSR
Thieben (2003)
GDP,
INVGDP,
TFPG
FD-EXP, FD-EXP2, FD-EXPLOW , FD-
EXPMED, FD-EXPHIGH , FD-REV, SR
Martnez-Vazquez and
McNabc (2003)
GDP'
FD-EXP, FD-REV
Thieben (2005)
GDP,
INVGDP,
TFPG
FD-EXPLOW , FD-EXPMED, FD-
EXPHIGTHy CD
Iimi (2005) GDP FD, PF y FD*PF
Bodman and Ford (2006) GDP'
FD-EXP, FD-REV, TDEC1, TDEC2,
TDEC3, RDEC1, RDEC2, RDEC3,
EDEC1, EDEC2, FD, NSGUT,
ELECT,FU, EMPLOY
Thornton (2007) GDP OWNREV, OWNREV*OWNREV
GDP= Rate Gross Domestic Product per capita; GDP'= logarithm real of rate Gross Domestic
Product per capita; GKAP= average growth rate of real gross xed capital formation; TFPG = total
factor productivity growth; INVGDP = average gross investment share of real gross domestic product;
FD-EXP/ FD-REV = share of sub-national government expenditures/revenues in general government
expenditures/revenues, net of intergovernmental transfers; SR = share of own revenues of lower levels
in their total revenues; FD-EXPNDEP= ratio of local government expenditures to total government
expenditures minus defense and social security expenditures; FD-REVGIA= ratio of local revenues
minus grants-in-aid to total government revenues; FD-EXP2 = transformation indicator FD-EXP
to test for \hump-shared" relationships between economic performance and scal decentralization;
CHSR = indicator to test whether increasing self-reliance of subnational governments have eects on
economic growth; FDLOW / FDMED/ FDHIGH= theree dummy variables that are denoted for \low
degree of scal decentralization" / for \medium degree of scal decentralization" / for \high degree
of scal decentralization; CD = variable dummy which is assumed as 1 if the governmental system
is centralised and 0 if is federal; PF = measure that reects the degree od political devolution at the
municipal level; FD*PF = measure that allows us to test the hypothesis of scal decentralization and
political freedom as complementary; TDEC1/TDEC2/TDEC3 = there measures of tax rerevenues
decentralization: subnational own tax revenue/ subnational own and shared tax/ total subnational
tax revenue; all calculated as the share of general government tax revenues; RDEC1/RDEC2/RDEC3
= own taxes refer to those taxes for which the sub-natioanl government can determine the tax rate/
or tax bases or both; EDEC1/EDEC2 = percentage of consolidated general government expenditures,
without social security payment; EDEC1 excludes transfers to other levels of government, whereas
EDEC2 includes transfers to other levels of government net of received transfers; NSGUT = the
number of sub-national jurisdictions in the intermediates and lower tiers of government; ELECT=
indicator to account for electoral decentralization; FU = the indicator of constitutional structure is an
index of federalism; EMPLOY = ratio of sub-natioanl government employees to central government
employees; OWNREV = the average tax revenues of sub-national governments stemming from the
tax bases and tax rates over which they have full discretion; OWNREV* OWNREV = quadratic
indicator of OWNREV.
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lect \industrial output of the iit region" deated by the regional price deator.
And lastly, in the Spanish case, Sole-Olle and Esteller-More (2006) elaborate two
indicators that pick up investments by all the levels of government divided by
the previous year`s capital stock. These indicators reect two dierent types of
spending categories: roads (Irit=Rit 1 ) and education (I
e
it=Eit 1 ).
5.2. Explanatory Variables
As for the explanatory variables that reect the growth rate of an economy, the
main divergences are in the denition of the scal decentralization indicators.
In the studies among countries, picked up in the Table 3, the database more
widely used is The Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Most authors choose the budget data approach and they
approximate the degree of scal decentralization using the share of sub-national
government expenditures/revenues in general government expenditures/revenues;
net of intergovernmental transfers (FD-EXP or FD-REV).
Nevertheless, in certain investigations, together with these indicators, other
types of statiscal are included. This way, Oates (1995) uses an alternative mea-
surement for the independence of sub-national levels. This author employs the
\self-reliance" ratio (SR), as the share of own revenues of lower levels in their
total revenues.
Phillips and Woller (1997), on the other hand, build two additional variables
of scal decentralization. On one hand, the ratio of local government expenditures
to total government expenditures minus defense and social security expenditures
(FD-EXPNDEP ). On the other one, they design a variable (FD-REVGIA) by
means of the transformation of the conventional indicator of tributary decen-
tralization (FD-REV). Concretely, FD-REVGIA is dened as the ratio of local
revenues minus grants-in-aid to total government revenues.
In turn, Thieben (2000) chooses dierent measures of scal decentralization.
On one hand, it uses the variables already used by other authors (FD-EXP and
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Table 4: Chosen Variables - Status Quo of single-country analysis. Source: Self-
elaboration.
Author
Dependent
variable
Explanatory variable of the scal
decentralization
Zhang and Zou (1998) GYPREG FD-EXP, FD-EXPEB , FD-EXPB+EB
Jin, Quian and Weingast
(1999)
GYPREG FD-EXP, FD-EXPEB , FD-EXPB+EB
Xie, Zou and Davoodi
(1999)
FD-EXP
Lin and Liu (2000) GYPREG MRR-REV
Zhang and Zou (2001)
GYPREGCHINA FD-EXP
GYPREGINDIA
FD-EXP, FD-EXPpc, FD-REV, FD-
REVPC
Behnisch, Buettner and
Stegarescu (2003)
TFPG CEN-EXP, CEN-EXPEP&SC
Akai and Sakata (2002) GYPEST FD-EXP, FD-REV, AII , AIII , PRI
Desai, Freinkman and
Goldberg (2003)
GYPt/GYP1990 RR-TAXREV
Feld, Kirchgassner and
Schaltrdger (2004)
GYPREG
FD-EXP, FD-REV, MAT-GRANTS,
FISC-COMP, FRAGM, URBAN
Akai, Nishimura and
Sakata (2004)
GYPEST FD-EXP, FD-REV
Jin and Zou (2005) GYPREG
FD-EXP, FD-EXPpc, FD-REV, FD-
REVPC
Carrion-i-Silvestre,
Espasa and Mora (2006)
GYPREG FD-EXP y FD-REV
Perez and Mora (2006) GYPREG FD-EXP y FD-REV
Sole-Olle and Esteller-
More (2006)
Irit=Rit 1
Ieit=Eit 1
decrit
deceit
Esteban (2006) GYPREG DESCgasto
GYPREG= the growth rate of real state income; TFPG = the rate of total factor productivity growth;
Irit=R
;
it 1I
e
it=Eit 1 = two indicators that pick up investments by all the levels of government divided
by the year's capital stock ; FD-EXP/FD-REV = share of expenditures/revenues by each level of
government in consolidated government expenditures/revenues across all levels; FD-EXPEB , FD-
EXPB+EB , FD-REVPC , CEN-EXP, CEN-EXPEP&SC = derivations of the indicator FD-EXP/FD-
REV; MRR-REV = the marginal retention rate of locally collected budgetary revenue; AII= the ratio
of government's own revenue to total revenue, with revenues excluding federal grants; AIIII= the
ratio of local government'sown revenue to total revenue with revenues including federal grants; PRI =
the decentralization measure that incorporates both revenues and expenditure shares. The indicator
is dened as the mean of FD- EXP and FD-REV; RR-TAXREV = the tax revenue retention rate;
MAT-GRANTS = the matching grants per capita received in each Swiss Canton; FIS-COMP =
the indicator indicates that the higher dierence of average tax burden of the neighboring cantons,
the higher the pressure of tax competition on the cantonal and local tax authorities; FRAGM = the
number Communes in a Canton divided by population; URBAN = the share of people living in urban
areas; decrit / deceit = two indicators that reect the moment in that decentralization took place
in the responsibilities of road (decrit) and education (deceit) in each one of the Spanish regions;
DESCgasto =the percentage of public expense attributed to Spanish Autonomous Communities with
respect to the total of government expenditure in these Communities.
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SR). On the other hand, it makes a simple transformation indicator of FD-EXP
to test for \hump-shaped" relationships between economic performance and s-
cal decentralization (FD-EXP2). Finally, he elaborates an indicator (CHSR) to
test whether increasing self-reliance of subnacional governments have eects on
economic growth.
Additionally, Thieben (2003; 2005) uses in an alternative way, together with
the indicators of scal decentralization already employed in the year 2000, three
dummy variables that are denoted FD-EXPHIGH for \high degree of scal de-
centralization", FD-EXPMED for \medium degree of scal decentralization" and
FD-EXPLOW for \low degree of scal decentralization". In turn, for Thieben
(2005) the model is augmented with a variable dummy (CD), which is assumed
as 1 if the governmental system is centralised and 0 if it is federal.
Iimi (2005) incorporates a measure of \political freedom" (PF) that reects
the degree of political devolution at the municipal level. The reason is that po-
litical freedom is closely linked with decentralization mechanisms and thus with
economic growth in the following sense. \Firstly, one might think that the ben-
ets of scal decentralization depend on how much political freedom to country
enjoys. If freedom is low, the benets based on the Tiebout mechanism may not
be strongly realized. If freedom is high, the benets may be realized" (Iimi 2005,
453). According to this perspective, an interaction term FD*PF should be of par-
ticular interest, since it allows us to test the hypothesis of scal decentralization
and political freedom as complementary.
Bodman and Ford's (2006) analysis incorporates traditional measures of s-
cal decentralization (FD-EXP and FD-REV) and a number of new measures that
attempt to account for dierent degrees of sub-national scal autonomy. The di-
mension of scal decentralization considered in this study, and the most impor-
tant dimension, is the extent to which scal decision-making is decentralised. This
paper presents three measures of tax revenue (tax-only) decentralization: subna-
tional own tax revenue (TDEC1), subnational own and shared tax (TDEC2) and
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total subnational tax revenue (TDEC3), all calculated as the share of general
government tax revenue. On the other hand, own taxes refer to those taxes for
which the sub-national government can determine the tax rate or tax bases or
both (RDEC1, RDEC2 and RDEC3).
Bodman and Ford's (2006) study also provides two measures of expenditures
decentralization. These measures are based on total sub-national expenditure
and lending, minus loan repayments, as a percentage of consolidated general gov-
ernment expenditures, without social security payment (EDEC1 and EDEC2).
EDEC1 excludes transfers to other levels of government, whereas EDEC2 includes
transfers to other levels of government net of received transfers.
Futhermore, Bodman and Ford's (2006) paper uses \hump-shaped" indica-
tores based on the traditional budget dates measures. The countries were divided
into ve equal sized groups, denoting very low, low, medium, high and very high
decentralization (FD).
Finally, a number of other measures of government decentralization, omitted
from previous studies of federal decentralization and growth, are considered in
the Bodman and Ford's (2006) paper:
1. The number of sub-national jurisdictions in the intermediates and lower
tiers of government is considered (NSGVT);
2. An indicator was included to account for electoral decentralization (ELECT).
Taking the value of 0 if there are no sub-national elections, 1 if either local
or intermediate tiers of government are elected, or 2 if both are subject to
elections;
3. The indicator of constitutional structure is an index of federalism, one to
ve - point scale(FU): (1) unitary and centralized; (2) unitary but decen-
tralized; (3) semi-federal; (4) federal but centralized and (5) federal and
decentralized;
4. Resource decentralization is considered using the ratio of sub-national gov-
ernment employees to central government employees (EMPLOY).
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And, lastly, the independent variables of decentralization of Thornton's (2007)
study are the average tax revenue of sub-national governments stemming from
the tax bases and tax rates over which they have full discretion, OWNREV, and
a variable to test for the notion of \hump-shaped" relation between scal decen-
tralization and growth proposed in Thieben's (2003) study, which is a quadratic
indicator of OWNREV, (OWNREV)*(OWNREV).
If we center in single-countries studies, reected in Table 4, the indicators
that are used mostly are the shares of spending/revenues by each level of gov-
ernment in consolidated government spending/revenues across all levels, both in
absolute terms as in values per capita, or their derivations (FD-EXP; FD-REV).
Nevertheless, in Akai and Sakata (2002), apart from the conventional indica-
tors of revenues (FD-EXP) and expenses (FD-REV), they also elaborate three
additional statistical. On one hand, those that seek to reect the grade of s-
cal autonomy of a sub-central government in a State (\AI" and \AII"). On the
other hand, a normalized statistical one (PRI) which reects both revenue and
expenditure aspects of scal decentralization.
\AI" is dened as the ratio of local government's own revenue to total revenue,
with revenues excluding federal grants; \AII" is the ratio of local government's
own revenue to total revenue, with revenues including federal grants; and \PRI"
represents a decentralization measure that incorporates both revenue and expen-
diture shares. The production-revenue indicator (PRI) is dened as the mean of
FD-EXP and FD-REV.
On the other hand, Lin and Liu (2000) and Desai, Freinkman and Goldberg
(2003) apply an alternative focus of the measure of decentralization scal applied.
In the rst study, the scal decentralization measure is \the marginal retention
rate of locally collected budgetary revenue" (MRR-TAXREV). In this study, the
scal decentralization measure is determined by how much of the revenue in-
crements were kept by provincial governments. Whereas Desai, Freinkman and
Goldberg (2003) use as a measure of scal incentives, \the tax revenue reten-
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tion rate" (RR-TAXREV). This variable reects only ocial taxes, collected and
accounted for in regulating government budgets.
In an alternative way, Feld, Kirchgassner and Schaltegger (2004) depict the
grade of scal decentralization by means of the application of six alternative
statisticals. These authors use the habitual indicators of revenues and expenses
used in the literature (FD-EXP and FD-REV) and four more that capture con-
crete aspects of the Swiss model of decentralization. The rst statistical (MAT-
GRANTS) reects the matching grants per capita received in each Swiss Canton.
This variable reects the nancial importance that the matching grants have in
the model of cooperative federalism in Switzerland. The second indicator (FISC-
COMP) indicates that the higher the dierence of average tax burden of the
neighboring cantons, the higher the pressure of tax competition on the cantonal
and local tax authorities. More concretely, this variable is measured by the dier-
ence of canton's tax, in the highest income tax bracket of a million Swiss francs
annual taxable income, and the average of its neighboring cantons' tax burden
in that bracket. On the other hand, the variable fragmentation (FRAGM) is
constructed by the number Communes in a Canton divided by population. It is
supposed to capture the lack of exploiting economic of scale. Lastly, Urbanization
(URBAN), measured by the share of people living in urban areas, is included to
represent the new eld of economic geography that reects that urban economic
centres develop more strongly that the periphery.
On the other hand, Sole-Olle and Esteller-More (2006) opt, for the Spanish
case, for the denition of two variable Dummies. These indicators reect the
moment in that decentralization took place in the responsibilities of road and
education in each one of the Spanish regions. \dcr it" is a dummy equal to 1
if the regional government has the responsibility of providing regional roads.
Alternatively, \decei"t is weighted sum of a dummy equal to 1 if the regional
government has the responsibility of providing primary and secondary education,
and a dummy equal to 1 if the regional government has the responsibility of
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providing higher education, with the weights being the average share of both
education levels in total education investment.
Finally, Esteban (2006) uses as a variable of scal decentralization the per-
centage of public expense attributed to Spanish Autonomous Communities with
respect to the total of government expenditure in these Communities (DESCgto).
6. Conceptual Framework Employed
The theoretical model mostly backed by economists has been that of Davoodi and
Zou (1998). The theoretical framework in which these authors sustain is the en-
dogenous growth model of Barro (1990), where the production function has mul-
tiple inputs including private and public spending. This perspective is adopted by
Davoodi and Zou (1998); Zhang and Zou (1998); Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999),
Zhang and Zou (2001)7; Akai and Sakata (2002), Akai, Nishimura and Sakata
(2004)8 Iimi (2005); Jin and Zou (2005); Carrion-i-Silvestre, Espasa and Mora
(2006); Perez and Cantarero (2006); Esteban (2006). Concretely, in the model of
Davoodi and Zou (1998), the public spending is divided in three government lev-
els and the spending shares are determined assigned at the dierent government
levels with the macroeconomic objective of maximization of the growth. The
model's essential implication is that for a given share of total government spend-
ing to GDP, the growth-maximizing government budget shares are proportional
to the relative productivity of federal and local level governments9.
7 In turn, Zhang and Zou (2001) outline a greater complexity in the question of the
sub-central government expenditure, that augments the aforementioned approach and
develops a model that links multiple sectors of public spending by multiple levels of
government to economic growth.
8 Equally, Akai, Nishimura and Sakata (2004) referring to Barro (1990) developed a
model, which considers dierences in the quality as well as complementarities of public
services.
9 As Iimi (2005) indicates an interpretation of the model of Davoodi and Zou (1998)
is that \When the productivity eect of sub-national level government spending is rel-
atively large compared with the central government expenditure, scal decentralization
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On the other hand, the studies of Lin and Liu (2000), Martnez-Vazquez and
M.Mcnab (2003), Thieben (2003; 2005)); Feld, Kirchgassner and Schaltradger
(2004) and Bodman and Ford (2006) use a dierent approach. Following Mankiw,
Romer andWeil (1992), these authors use the model of exogenous growth of Solow
(1956) and they introduce the scal decentralization as a variable explanatory of
the growth rate of output per capita. The cornerstone of these last works is to
admit that the exogenous parameter not only reects technological aspects of the
economy but also a measure of the economic performance of the decentralized
Public Sector. i.e. the level of technology reects not just technology but also
dierences in resource endowment and institutions across countries/regions and
over time, as well as in other non-observable countries/region-specic character-
istics. This disintegration of the term \technological progress" is consistent with
the economic literature about the growth and with the hypotheses of conditional
convergence (Barro, 1991; Sala-i-Martin, 1994).
In any case, the previous studies probably use a theoretical framework ad-hoc,
since they don't allow to identify the causes of the estimated eect of decentral-
ization in the economic growth of a country. In this sense, the procedure used by
Solle-Olle and Esteller-More (2006) is quite dierent to that employed in previ-
ous investigations. Solle-Olle and Esteller-More (2006) consider the assignment
process among alternative investments and, then, they compare it with the eect
that this assignment process causes in decentralized decision-taking scenario as in
another centralized. In this point of the analysis, if the assignment process diers
among the two contexts of decision-taking, they are able to identify the ine-
ciency taken place under the centralized government structure. Also, combining
has a positive eect on the growth rate. However, holding the relative productivity con-
stant between governments, scal systems that are excessively decentralized are likely to
lower economic growth." Therefore, it is logical to expect that allocating budgetary re-
sources to less productive levels of government is harmful for the economic eciency and
therefore, for the economic growth of a country. This implies that if the sub-national
governments are inecient and faulty in the supply of local public goods, the scal
decentralization is not the best option.
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the obtained results with the estimates of the eects of the outlined alternative
investments (roads and education) on the economic growth, they can determine
the gain from the output due to the better assignment in the investments in the
decentralized decision-taking scenario.
Table 5: Analytical Framework - Status Quo of the studies among countries. Source:
Self- elaboration.
Author Analytical Framework
Oates (1995)
Dissertation of the investigation made by Sang Loh Kim and
Oates (Maryland)
Phillips and Woller
(1997)
Methodology of the tests of robustness of Levine and Renett
(1997) and Sala-i-Martin (1997)
Davoodi and Zou
(1998)
According to the model of endogenous growth of Barro
(1990) it establishes a production function of the type Cobb-
Douglas that incorporates as an additional input the public
expenditure of the dierent government levels
Yilmaz (1999) Not explicit any theoretical model
Thieben (2000)
He only makes reference to the employment of a theoretical
model of endogenous growth without providing more partic-
ulars
Thieben (2003)
He uses the model of economic growth of Solow enlarged by
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)
Martnez-Vazquez
and McNab (2003)
It uses the model of economic growth of Solow enlarged by
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)
Thieben (2005)
He uses the model of economic growth of Solow enlarged by
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)
Iimi (2005)
Methodology based on a version of the endogenous growth
model provided by Davoodi and Zou
Boadman and Ford
(2006)
Model of economic growth of Solow (1956)
Thornton (2007) Not explicit any theoretical model
Among the two most backed theoretical focuses, models of endogenous court
vs. models of exogenous court, it seems that there is a clear preference to con-
trast the inuence of the processes of scal decentralization empirically on the
economic growth from an environment of endogenous growth. Concretely, like it
is reected in the Tables 5 and 6, the fact stands out that most of the studies
of individual countries are sustained theoretically in the contributions of Barro
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(1990), where the government expenditure assigned at each government level is
added to the production function as one more productive input.
7. Empiric Methodology
The econometric specications that are used, mainly refer to two particular proce-
dures in the treatment of the data: regressions with cross-section data as opposed
to those that are solved on a panel of data.
In the panels of data the variables of annual frequency are usually used.
Although, it is true that, it is possible to establish panels with data averages
of more than a year of frequency, with the purpose of grasping the possibility
of the long term eects. This is the case detected in Davoodi and Zou (1998)
and Phillips and Woler (1997) who use a panel with data averaging a ve-year
or decenal frequency, in the rst case; and of annual frequency, triennial and
ve-year, in the second case.
The pros and contras of these two types of data treatment are discussed in
the investigations of Thieben (2000; 2001). This author grants, in both studies,
a bigger priority to the regressions of cross-section with data annual averages.
However, in spite of most authors lean for the methodology applied on panel
data, Akai and Sakata (2002) use regressions with cross-section data and they
introduce a variable dummy that picks up the specic characteristics of each
country.
Regarding the estimator used by dierent authors, the estimador of Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) is the one that prevails in most of studies. Nevertheless, the
exceptions of this estimator appear depicted in Tables 7 and 8. For example,
Zhang and Zou (1998), Yilman (2000) and Thieben (2000) use the estimator of
General Least Square (GLS); Akai, Nishimura and Sakata (2004) opt for Max-
imum Likelihood (ML) estimation; Desai, Freinkman and Goldberg (2003) use
the Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estimate to minimize the simultaneity and
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Table 6: Analytical Framework - Status Quo of single-country analysis. Source: Self-
elaboration.
Author Analytical Framework
Zhang and Zou
(1998)
Methodology of Barro (1990), Levine and Renelt (1992) and
Davoodi and Zou (1998).
Jin, Quian and Wein-
gast (1999)
The study of Zhang and Zou reexamine (1998) including a
variable of volatility
Xie, Zou, Davoodi
(1999)
They use the same theoretical model that is elaborated in
Davoodi and Zou (1998)
Lin and Liu (2000)
The methodology of Mankiw, Romer and Weil continue
(1992) and they specify a model of growth of Solow (1956)
Zhang and Zou
(2001)
In accordance with Barro (1990) and Zhang and Zou (1998),
they develop a model that connects the diverse public ex-
penditure categories in the dierent government levels with
the economic growth of the regions
Behnisch, Buettner
Stegarescu (2003)
They don't make reference to any theoretical pattern
Akai and Sakata
(2002)
The same theoretical model that the applied one for Xie, Zou
and Davoodi (1999), based on the pattern of Davoodi and
Zou (1998)
Desai, Freinkman,
Goldberg (2003)
They don't make reference to any theoretical pattern
Feld, Kirchgassner
and Schaltrdger
(2004)
I Model of neoclassical growth of Maniw, Romer and Weil
(1992)
Akai, Nishimura,
Sakata (2004)
According to Barro (1990), a theoretical model is given that
considers the existent dierences in the quality of the public
services as a consequence of the capacity of the bureaucrats
as well as of the complementarity of the public services given
in the jurisdictions
Jin and Zou (2005)
Methodology of Barro (1990) and model of Davoodi and Zou
(1998)
Carrion-i-Silvestre,
Espasa and Mora
(2006)
Model of Xie, Zou and Davoody (1999) based on Davoodi
and Zou (1998)
Perez and Cantarero
(2006)
Model of Davoody and Zou (1998)
Sole-Olle and
Esteller-More (2006)
Model elaborated by the authors based on a production func-
tion where the output depends, among other factors, on
\Ait", wich is a positive and neutral eciency parameter
Esteban (2006)
Methodology of Barro (1990) and Model of Davoodi and Zou
(1998)
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endogenousity of some explanatory variables that can be the case of the transfers
received by the subcentral governments.
Table 7: Empiric Methodology - Status Quo of studies among countries. Source: Self-
elaboration.
Author Empiric methodology
Oates (1995) No details available
Phillips and
Woller (1997)
Panel regressions based on annual, three and ve year average.
Fixed Eects Model. OLS (Ordinary Least Square) estimation
Davoodi and Zou
(1998)
Panel regressions is estimated on dates averaged over ve and
ten year periods. Fixed Eects Model. OLS estimation
Yilmaz (1999)
Panel regressions based on annual data. Fixed Eects Model.
GLS (General Least Squuare estimation
Thieben (2000)
Cross-sectional growth regressions based on annual average of
dates. GLS estimation (with cross section weights)
Thieben (2003)
Cross-sectional growth regressions. GLS estimation (with cross
section weights)
Pooled cross-sectional regressions. GLS method is applied (with
cross section weight) using annual dates
Martnez-
Vazquez and
McNab (2004)
Panel regressions based on annual data. Fixed Eects Model.
GLS estimation
Thieben (2005)
A cross-sectional analysis with only one observation for each
country considered. OLS estimator
Iimi (2005)
A cross-sectional analysis based on annual average date. The es-
timation results based on OLS and Instrumental Variables (IV)
Bodman and
Ford (2006)
Pooled cross-section regressions and cross-sectional analysis.
OLS estimator
Thornton (2007)
Cross-section regressions based on annual average of dates. OLS
estimator
More specically, and among the most recent investigations, Bodman and
Ford (2005) go even further in Thiebens (2000; 2001) analysis of the relation-
ship between scal decentralizaton and the components of the growth equation.
His study uses pooled cross-section regression. On the other hand, in Thieben
(2005) the simple Ordinary Least Square method is used with the assumption
that the independent variables are exogenous. The estimate is a pure cross-section
analysis; that is, short-term time eects were eliminated by forming averages to
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enable only the long-term eects to be measured. Equally, in Thornton (2007),
given the relatively small sample size, the estimation technique was Ordinary
Least Squares with average data for the period. Whereas the use of Ordinary
Least Squares in this context implies that the explanatory variable is exogenous,
which may be problematic, the relatively small sample prevents the use of an al-
ternative Instrumental Variable (IV) method. In the same way, in Iimi (2005) and
Esteban (2006) the estimation results are based on the Ordinary Least Square
and Instrumental Variable technique using data averages for the period of ref-
erence. Jin and Zou (2005) use a panel data set for 30 provinces in China. The
regression analysis in this study uses the panel data sets combining time series
and cross section. All coecients are estimated with xed-eects with corrections
for panel heteroskedasticity and panel serial correlation.
8. Main Results
In theory, it is expected that decentralization leads to ecient provision of local
public services and results in rapid economic growth but the empirical evidence
between scal decentralization and economic groth is ambiguous.
The results of the studies on the impact of scal decentralization on economic
growth that have been conducted on a cross-country analysis, indeed end up with
controversial results (Table 10).
Iimi (2005) nds that scal decentralization has a signicant positive impact
on per capita growth, implying that the transfer of scal functions to sub-national
governments is condicive to economic growth.
Thieben's (2005) studies can conclude that decentralization does generally
have a positive inuence on growth. The results show that scal decentralization
can promote growth to limited extents. Countries with medium decentralization
have a slightly higher investment ratio and slightly higher growth in total factor
productivity than countries with a high or a low degree of decentralization.
Status Quo of the Inuence of Fiscal Decentralization on Economic Growth 75
Table 8: Empiric methodology - Status Quo of single-country analysis. Source: Self-
elaboration.
Autor Empiric Methodology
Zhang and Zou
(1998)
Cross-province estimations based on provincial annual data.
Fixed Eect Models. GLS (General Least Square) estimation
Jin, Quian and Wein-
gast (1999)
Empirical methodology of Zhang and Zou (1998) including
a variable dummy that grasps the eects of the national
macroeconomic uctuations
Xie, Zou an Davoodi
(1999)
Time series analysis. OLS (Ordinary Least Square) estima-
tion.
Lin and Liu (2000)
Empirical analysis based on province-level panel data. Fixed
Eect Models. Province and year dummies. (further details
are not available)
Zhang and Zou
(2001)
Application to China: Empirical estimations based on
provincial data. Provincial xed eects model.
Application to India: Regression analysis based on the panel
data. Estimations with a ve year forward-moving average
of real per capita income growth.
Behnisch, Buet-
tner and Stegarescu
(2003)
Lineal regressions and time series analysis (further details
are not available).
Akai and Sakata
(2002)
Cross-section of average growth rates. OLS and Fixed Eects
Model, Time Dummies.
Desai, Freinkman
and Goldberg (2003)
Regression analysis of regional data and simultaneous equa-
tion models based on average data with time specic eects.
OLS estimation with panel-corrected standard errors and
three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation
Feld, Kichgassner
and Schaltegger
(2004)
Pooled cross-section time-series model. OLS and TSLS esti-
mation.
Akai, Nishimura and
Sakata (2004)
Panel cross-sectional growth regressions with time and state
xed eects. Maximum likelihood estimation
Jin and Zou (2005)
Panel data set combining time series and cross section. Coef-
cients estimated with xed-eects with corrections for panel
heteroskedasticity and panel serial correlation.
Carrion-i-Silvestre,
Espasa y Mora
(2006)
1980-1998: empirical methodology of Xie, Zou and Davoody
(1998)
1991-1996: empirical analysis based on the panel data (fur-
ther details are not avaible)
Perez y Cantarero
(2006)
Empirical analysis based on regional-level panel data. Error
components model and Instrumental Variables (IV)
Sole-Olle y Esteller-
More (2006)
Panel data technique. OLS and GMM (Generalizad Method
of Moments) estimators
Esteban (2006)
Cross-section of average growth rates. OLS estimator and
Instrumental Variables (IV)
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Similarly, Bodman and Ford (2006) suggest that whilst little evidence of a
direct relationship between scal decentralization and economic growth is found,
some evidence is found to support the hypothesis that a medium degree of scal
decentralization is positively related to growth in the capital stock and level of
human capital.
At the same time, the empirical results presented in Thornton (2007) suggest
that when measures of scal decentralization are limited to the revenue over which
sub-national governments have real autonomy, there is no statistically signicant
relationship betwen scal decentralization and economic growth. Whereas, when
revenue decentralization is measured by only those own-revenue, over which sub-
national government have full discretion, scal decentralization does not appear
to eect economic growth in mid to high income countries. Thornton (2007) indi-
cates that \A serious problem with much of the literature on the macroeconomic
impact of scal decentralization is that it fails to make an appropriate distintion
betwen administrative and substantive decentralization by not recognizing that
high sub-national revenue and spending shares do not necessarily indicate high
local autonomy".
On the other hand, the empirical results concerning the impact of decentral-
ization on economic growth for individual countries are not less ambiguous than
those detected in the studies among countries (Table 9). As Jin y Zou (2005)
suggest, the eects of scal decentralization in any given case depend critically
on the nature of scal institutions and the political system in place. These au-
thors suggest that expenditure and revenue decentralization levels should further
diverge to benet provincial growth. In the rst phase (1979-1993), provincial
economic growth is negatively associated with expenditure decentralization and
positively associated with revenue decentralization. The negative association be-
tween expenditure decentralization and provincial real GDP growth rate is con-
sistent with Zhang and Zou's (1998) results. Hence, their interpretation that \the
central government may be in a better position to undertake public investment
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with nation-wide externalities in the early stages of economic development" is
supported by this result. In the second phase (1994-1999), the regression results
testing the relationship between scal decentralization and growth for the pe-
riod after 1994, when the tax assignment system was applied, suggest that there
is no signicant association between expenditure decentralizaton and provincial
economic growth. Meanwhile revenue decentralization is found to be negatively
associated with provincial economic growth, with a high level of statistical sig-
nicance.
On the other hand, in the case of the Indian economy, Zhang y Zou (2001)
nd a positive and signicant relationship between the per capita scal decen-
tralization shares and state economic growth in India; While in the case of the
Chinese economy the results of Zhang y Zou (1998) reproduce themselves.
Jin, Qian and Weingast (1999), however, nd a weakly signicant positive
eect of expenditure decentralization on the economic growth of the same sample
of Chinese provinces over time. The most important dierence between these
studies consists in the fact that Zhang y Zou (1998) do not use time dummies10.
Lin and Liu (2000) corroborate the result of a positive impact of decentralizaton
on economic growth in Chinese provinces for the period 1970 to 1993.
Desai et al. (2003) nd that an increase in the retention tax (as a share of
locally generated taxes that are left with the regional budget), for most Russian
regions is generally accompanied by stronger economic growth.
From another perspective, Feld, Kichgassner and Schaltegger (2004) indicate
that matching grants have a negative impact on economic performance while tax
competition is at least not harmful to economic performance. Tax competition
appears to induce Swiss Cantons to allocate public funds more eciently in such
a way that economic performance of a canton improves.
10 Jin, Qian and Weingast (1999) use the empirical methodology of Zhang and Zou
(1998) including a variable dummy that grasps the eects of the national macroeconomic
uctuations.
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Exploring the American economy, Xie et al. (1999) also find for the US states
insignificant coefficients on local and state spending shares, but they argue that
these insignificant fiscal decentralization shares indicate consistency with growth
maximization. Akai and Sakata (2001) demonstrate that the expenditure decen-
tralization positively affects economic growth of the US states. However, decen-
tralization on the revenue side and the indicators for fiscal autonomy of sub-
national levels do not have a significant impact. Equally, Akai, Nishimura and
Sakata (2004) underline the positive influence on economic growth. These authors
test the hypothesis of a “hump-shaped” relationship between fiscal decentraliza-
tion and economic growth and find that US states with a low degree of fiscal
decentralization tend to grow stronger.
Examining the impact on growth from the perspective of centralization, Bh-
nisch et al. (2003) report a statistically significant positive effect of overall cen-
tralization on the German growth of productivity.
In turn, in the case of the Spanish economy, Carrion-i-Silvestre, Espasa and
Mora (2006); Pe´rez and Cantarero (2006); and Esteban (2006), emphasize on the
fact that the contribution that the Spanish fiscal decentralization process has had
positive effects on regional economic growth.
Equally, the analysis of the Spanish economy done by Sole´-Olle´ and Esteller-
More´ (2006) confirm the hypothesis of the “Decentralization Theorem” concern-
ing the greater responsiveness of sub-central government to local needs. Their
results show the need of decentralizing investment in order to maximize the rate
of economic growth. This way, roads and educational investiments made by sub-
central governments in Spain is much more sensitive to changes in output than
the investiment made by central government. As Sole´-Olle´ and Esteller-More´
(2006) suggest, if sub-central governments are more responsive to needs than the
central government, the composition of the capital stock under centralization is
not efficient. Therefore, the Spanish fiscal decentralization process would have
eliminated this distortion.
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Table 9: Main results- Status Quo of single-country analysis. Source: Self-elaboration.
Author Main results
Zhang and Zou
(1998)
They nd a negative and signicant impact of the scal decentralization
on the economic growth of Chinese provinces.
Jin, Quian and
Weingast (1999)
The scal decentralization promotes the economic growth of Chinese
provinces.
Xie, Zou and
Davoodi (1999)
Existing spending shares for local and state governments in USA are con-
sistent with the objective of maximizing the growth of the economy.
Lin and Liu (2000)
The scal decentralization contributes signicantly to economic growth in
China, which is consistent with the hypothesis that scal decentralization
can increase economic eciency.
Zhang y Zou (2001)
As in Zhang and Zou (1998), they nd a negative and signicant asso-
ciation between scal decentralization and provincial economic growth in
China.
However, they found that scal decentralization is positively and signi-
cantly associated with state economic growth in India. The state alloca-
tion of public spending in various sectors is broadly consistent with growth
maximizing
Behnisch, Buettner
y Stegarescu (2003)
The analysis shows a negative signicance of state government expendi-
ture, and therefore, indicates that the coordination of policies among state
level governments as part of the cooperative federalism is not ecient with
regard to productivity growth.
Akai y Sakata (2002)
The estimated coecient on scal decentralization is positive and statis-
tically signicant. They suggest that recent moves toward scal decentral-
ization by developed countries may stimulate their economic growth.
Desai, Freinkman y
Goldberg (2003)
Tax retention, as a proxy for sub-national scal autonomy, has a positive
eect on the cumulative output recovery of regions since the break-up of
the Soviet Union. They also nd, however, that this eect decreases as
rentable income streams to regions increase
Feld, Kichgassner y
Schaltegger (2004)
The results indicate that matching grants have a negative impact on eco-
nomic performance while tax competition is at least not harmful to eco-
nomic performance. Tax competition appears to induce Cantons to allo-
cate public funds more eciently in such a way that economic performance
of a canton is improved.
Akai, Nishimura and
Sakata (2004)
They observe a \hump-shaped" relationship between scal decentraliza-
tion an economic growth in United States. They also detect that an op-
timum degree of decentralization, consistent with the objetive of growth
maximization is superior to that existent in the United States
Jin and Zou (2005)
For the time period of 1979 to 1993, the results suggest that expendi-
ture and revenue decentralization levels should further diverge to benet
provincial growth. This explanation supports the notion that revenue de-
centralization stimulates revenue mobilization from local sources, it is sug-
gests that expenditure centralization promotes growth because the central
government spends more eciently than the provinces.
For the time period of 1994 to 1999, the regression results suggest that at
a given level of expenditure decentralization, more revenue centralization
contributes to growth in China. This nding supports the view that the
Center is in a better position to allocate budgetary resources for horizontal
balance, macroeconomic stability and investment in projects of national
signicance
Carrion-i-Silvestre,
Espasa y Mora
(2006)
the Spanish decentralization process has had a positive eect on both
global and regional economic growth
Perez y Cantarero
(2006)
Positive and signicant relationship between the scal decentralization
and the economic growth in Spain
Sole-Olle y Esteller-
More (2006)
The investment in education and road carried out by the sub-central gov-
ernments is more sensitive to variations in the regional output that the one
made by the central government. The results indirectly suggest that in the
centralized regimen the composition of the capital stock diers from the
growth-maximizing one, and so economic growth is enhanced by means of
decentralization
Esteban (2006)
The process of scal decentralization in Spain has had a positive eect on
regional economic growth.
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Table 10: Main results - Status Quo of studies among countries. Source: Self-elaboration.
Author Main results
Oates (1995)
He detects a positive and significant correlation between fiscal
decentralization and the rate of growth per capita
Philipps and
Woller (1997)
For less developed countries, they fail in the intent of determin-
ing a significant relationship between both processes. They are
only able to find a weak inverse relationship between level of
tributary decentralization and the rate of economic growth in
the countries of more development level
Davoodi y Zou
(1998)
For developing countries they obtain a negative relationship,
but not a significant one between the decentralization and the
growth and they are not able to determine the relationship that
exists in countries of more economic development
Yilmaz (1999)
He finds a positive and significant impact of the fiscal decentral-
ization in the per capita growth in the unitary countries. While
in the case of federal countries the results are not conclusive.
Thieben (2002)
For the countries of high-income, the analysis suggests that a
“hump-shaped” relation exists between the economic growth
and the capital formation, as between the economic growth and
the fiscal decentralization. By the same token, the empiric evi-
dence suggests that the capital formation is positively related to
the increments of the governments sub-centrales’ self-reliance.
Thieben (2003)
It is observed that the convergence of the countries of high-
income of the OECD toward a medium degree of fiscal decen-
tralization of expenditures to promote the economic growth
Mart´ınez-
Va´zquez y
McNab (2004)
They do not detect a direct relationship between fiscal decentral-
ization and economic growth, although they are able to establish
an indirect relationship through their favorable impact in price
stability.
Thieben (2005)
The hypothesis that fiscal decentralization can promote growth
to a limited extent was confirmed. Countries with medium de-
centralization have a slightly higher investment ratio and slightly
higher growth in total factor productivity than countries with a
high or a low degree of decentralization.
Iimi (2005)
This paper finds that fiscal decentralization has a significant
positive impact on per capita GDP growth
Bodman and
Ford (2006)
There is little or no stadistical evidence of a direct relation-
ship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth for
the sample of OECD countries examined, given the data and
methods used. However, when the components of the growth
equation are analyzed, there is some evidence that a medium
degree of decentralization is best for the growth in both physi-
cal and human capital
Thornton (2007)
When revenue decentralization is measured only by those own-
revenues upon which sub-national governments have full discre-
tion, fiscal decentralization does not appear to effect economic
growth in mid to high income countries
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9. Conclusions
In theory, it is expected that decentralization will lead to ecient provision of
local public services and will result in rapid economic development. However, the
studies presented here suggest that the relationship between scal decentraliza-
tion and economic growth is ambiguous.
More concretely, in cross-country analysis the main conclusion that can be
extracted is that a hump-shaped relationship seems to exist between the pro-
cesses of scal decentralization and economic growth. Also, due to the specic
problem in developing countries, it is necessary to limit the empirical analysis
only to high income-countries. In high income-countries, the results suggest that
the gains in growth that can be achieved through decentralization are limited.
Successive increase of a relatively low degree of scal decentralization does stim-
ulate investment and then so promotes economic growth. But there seem to be to
point beyond which, further decentralization no longer results in progress. The
economic explanation that emerges from these results is that if the grade of scal
decentralization is too high, intervention by central governement that would pro-
mote growth is not performed, and public goods with clear spatial delimitations
of its benets will not have spillover eects with their repercusions. In the same
way, too low a degree of decentralization can lead to loss of economic growth
because the local government oces would not have sucient incentives to pro-
duces public goods as eciently as possible, as a consequence of such knowledge
not suciently taken into account.
While in studies within a single country, the eects of scal decentralizaton in
any given case depend critically on the nature of the scal institution and political
system in place. Nevertheless, the results seem to lean towards the hypothesis
that a medium degree of scal decentralization tends to best promote economic
growth. In other words, an optimal grade of decentralization would be able to
capitalize a countrys economy at a larger pace than it would be at inferior levels
or superiors of scal decentralization.
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As a nal conclusion, cross-country studies as well as single-country anal-
ysis, tend to be inconclusive and they oer ambiguous and dierents results.
Among the factors that can cause these ambiguous and dierents results, the
ones that stand out most are, the dierent methodological approaches, the an-
alytical unit applied (studies among countries vs. studies single country) and
the diverse designs of the variable scal decentralization. In this sense, future
research may consider developing more disintegrated measures of scal decen-
tralization. The degree of decentralization should not be measured by the share
of expenditure/revenue of lower level governments as of that of total government
expenditure/revenue. In turn, it seems necessary to measure the dierences in
current autonomy among jurisdictions. It is necessary to elaborate measures of
scal decentralization that represent changes in scal decentralization or grasp
qualitative restrictions of subnational autonomy. In equal manner, it would be
advisable that those publicly responsable for each countrys Ocial Institute of
Statistics draw up better and wider ranged time series data. Finally, it is impor-
tant to note that new investigations, based on theoretical models that are able
to verify the relationship that lies between scal decentralization and economic
growth are very necessary.
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